This paper models a contest where several sellers compete for a contract with a single buyer. There are several styles of possible designs with a subset of them preferred by the buyer. We examine what happens when the buyer communicates information about his preferences. If the sellers are unable to change their style, then there is no e¤ect on the welfare of the sellers. If the sellers are able to make adjustments, extra information may either boost or damage the sellers'pro…ts. While the chance that there will be a proposal of a style preferred by the buyer cannot decrease, the buyer's surplus may increase or decrease.
and architecture. Information about preferences has been relevant in architecture design contests for well over 100 years. For instance, in 1835, a Royal Commission was formed to select a design to rebuild the Houses of Parliament. The preferred style was speci…ed to be either Gothic or Elizabethan ruling out the then popular styles of Neoclassical and Italianate (see Service, 1979) . The model may also be applicable to other contests not involving design such as competitions to hold the Olympics or other sporting events.
There are several related strands of literature. In auctions, there is a literature that examines the incentives for buyers to acquire information, for example, Lee (1985) , Cremer and Khalil (1992) , Persico (2000) , and Bergemann and Välimäki (2002) . There are also papers that consider the situation where the seller can a¤ect the information that the buyers receive. These include Milgrom and Weber (1982) , Kaplan and Zamir (2000) , Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007) and how communication a¤ects the equilibrium. In a somewhat related theme to this paper, Ganuza (2007) shows how poor alignment of incentives for the buyer to discover information about the desired design is a possible explanation for cost overruns in procurements. Comparison between Ganuza (2007) and this paper allows interpretation of the communication of information in this paper as choosing when information would become public: before the sellers submit (prepare) bids or after the bid submission and during the selection of the winning proposal. This is reasonable given the all-pay nature of the competition that we study (the gap between these times is non-trivial). 4 This comparison is furthered in the concluding 4 In addition, the buyer may learn about his preferences from the proposals themselves.
remarks by a single toy model that captures the basic intuition and results of both papers.
The paper takes the following structure. In the next section, we will describe the basic model. In Section 3, we …nd the equilibrium, describe our results about communication of preferences. In addition, we expand the analysis to cover communication about identity of the sellers. In Section 4, we conclude and discuss further possibilities of research.
Model
There is a buyer that is interesting in selecting a design. There are n sellers o¤ering possible designs. Each proposed design has two characteristics: quality and style. We assume that quality is simply the sunk e¤ort x i put into the proposal from seller i. The style of a proposal from a particular seller is determined from his exogenously-determined, privatelyknown type. Furthermore, the buyer's preference over styles is unknown to the sellers. Denote T = f1; : : : ; tg as the set of styles. Each seller's style is independently and uniformly drawn from this set.
The buyer strictly prefers a design in the set P to one in the set T =P where P T . When comparing a design within either P or T =P , the buyer looks at the quality of design. This can be represented by the buyer having utility over the accepted proposal u(x; ) : R T ! R where x is the e¤ort put into the accepted proposal and is the style. For this utility to match the speci…ed environment u(x; ) = x + ; if the proposal is from the preferred set ( 2 P ); where constant is the premium for a preferred design, and x otherwise ( 2 T =P ). 5 (We will discuss shortly the constraint that must be large enough.) The buyer selects his 5 One can think of a buyer as an agent for procurement and the higher x makes the agent better protected from possible future criticism. Along similar lines, there could be an exogenous chance of the design failing.
A higher x may help determine this earlier which may allow the buyer to save time rerunning the contest. We assume the terms of the payments are dictated by an industry standard and hence not a factor in the buyer's utility.
preferred design and in case of indi¤erence chooses randomly. The sellers know only p (#P ) and that each style has an equal chance of being in the preferred set.
We assume that once selected, the seller must complete the design. The amount of additional e¤ort needed to complete the design is given by a(x) where a(x) is weakly decreasing in x and weakly positive. This represents the notion that a higher quality proposal will have a lower amount of work needed to complete the project. We also assume that a 0 (x) > 1. This ensures that holding o¤ e¤ort until one gets the contract never costs more ( = argmin x x + a(x) for all 0; procrastinate if one can). Finally, the seller with the winning design gets a reward (prize) worth V (there is some industry standard or regulation keeping the prize …xed). To avoid a trivial solution, we assume that V > a(0). We have the additional constraint that > maxfzj z V a(z)g. This ensures that the premium is large enough such that in equilibrium the buyer will always strictly prefer a proposal in P over a proposal in T =P . 6;7 6 The buyer prefers a incomplete design with e¤ort x1 in the preferred set to a more complete design with e¤ort x2 that is not in the preferred set. We must have x2 < ; since if x2 ; seller 2 would not make a pro…t even if he wins since our assumption on implies V a(x2) x2 < 0: Since x2 < ; we have x1 + > x2: 7 We assume the buyer must select one of the proposals. Results should hold if the preferred designs are the only ones that are selected. This may happen in some cases. For instance, in 1850, a Royal Commission was formed to select a design for the Great Exhibition. Despite that 245 plans were submitted, none were selected.
The selection committee (which included Barry and Brunel) substituted their own design. Fortunately, they realized the weakness in design by committee and convinced Joseph Paxton to submit plans, creating the Crystal Palace (see Beaver, 1970 ).
Results

Equilibrium
We look for an equilibrium which is denoted by an n-tuple of cumulative distribution functions, CDFs, F i (x), where each seller i puts forth e¤ort x i according to the CDF F i (x); and given that the other sellers do the same, each seller has no incentive to deviate. (Note a pure strategy at x can be represented by F i (x) = 0 for x x and F i (x) = 1 for x > x :)
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium, the expected pro…t of a seller equals (n;
Proof. In the Appendix.
We make use of Lemma 1 to derive the equilibrium and show that it is unique as long as the preferred set is not trivial (neither equal to T nor empty).
Proposition 1 If P 6 = T and P 6 = ?, then the equilibrium is unique where all sellers use the same CDF equal to F where F satis…es the following equation:
If P = T or P = ?, any equilibrium will have m 2 sellers actively bidding and n m sellers always choosing 0. All active sellers will use the same CDF equal to F where F solves.
This uniqueness is unusual compared to the more standard all-pay auctions with complete information where there are multiple equilibria (see Kaplan, Luski and Wettstein, 2003) . For instance, take a standard all-pay auction with three bidders and a prize worth 1. There is an equilibrium with all three bidders using
There is also an equilibrium with one bidder i always choosing 0 and the other two bidders choosing F j (x) = x (where j 6 = i). Now let us look at an example to further understand the mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Here the pro…t would be (n;
: Using equation (1), the equilibrium distribution function is given by
; which implies
Notice that the top bid a seller will place is at x = 4=5. Thus, for the buyer to prefer a bid of 0 in the preferred set to a bid of 4=5 in the non-preferred set, we must have > 4=5: We assumed that > maxfzj a(z) + z V g = maxfzj 1 + z=2 2g = 2, so this is satis…ed.
Communication
In the auction literature, Milgrom and Weber (1982) show when values are a¢ liated, a seller should always release information. This would increase the seller's pro…ts and hurt the buyers' pro…ts. Gershkov (2009) shows the optimal auction involves full disclosure when values are a combination of private and common values. On the other hand. Kaplan and Zamir (2000) show in a particular auction design partial information release could be optimal. In our framework, we deal with a similar question about the release of information. The notable di¤erence (besides reversing the buyer's and sellers'roles) is that here the buyer is choosing between potentially heterogeneous objects and the information is about the di¤erences in the values of these objects to the buyer rather than information about the costs of a single object to the sellers.
More speci…cally, in our model, the information that the buyer possesses is about his preferences for the various contracts. In many cases, he may only learn his complete prefer-ences after the proposals are o¤ered or they may be expensive to learn beforehand. This may very well be the case with architecture contests, but it is quite possible that he may know his preferences partially before as in the case with Boeing and Airbus. For example, take a university holding a competition for a building design. The university may have preferences about the arrangement of o¢ ces and know this beforehand. For instance, the university may prefer o¢ ces be built around an open atrium over being built in more secluded hallways.
Because of this, information released may a¤ect the sellers' belief over which type of o¢ ce arrangement is preferred.
As we see from the university example, architecture …rms may be able to submit a proposal that is contingent on the information released. In the competition to rebuild the Houses of Parliament, the winner out of 97 proposals, Charles Barry, was known for his Italianate style, but for the competition he was able to switch to a Gothic design. In the case of Boeing The buyer releases information by sending a signal s 2 S that depends upon his preferences; namely, a function g : P ! (S); where P = fP T : #P = pg. The way that information is released, the g used by the buyer, is known to the sellers in advance. They then use Bayes rule to infer likelihood of each possible set of preferred styles and in particular, the likelihood that they are in that set. Not releasing information is equivalent to sending the same signal for each possible preferences: using a function such as g(P ) = s 1 for all P 2 P.
The g function can also incorporate cases where the buyer does not fully learn his preferences beforehand. For instance if T = f1; 2; 3g, p = 1 and the buyer cannot distinguish between P = f1g and P = f2g but can between P = f3g and P = f1g (and between P = f3g and P = f2g), then we are constrained by g(f1g) = g(f2g), but can have g(f3g) 6 = g(f1g).
To begin to examine the e¤ect of a release of information, we must …rst under what case, the sellers'pro…ts are maximized. We do so in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Given there are n sellers, the sellers' pro…ts are maximized when
Proof. Denote
The …rst-order condition
Note that a p t that is too low makes is very unlikely that any seller's style will be in the preferred set. A p t that is too high will make it too likely that two or more sellers will have a style in the preferred set. When
n ; the balance between these two forces is at an optimal.
We can make use of the above lemma and see, for one, if it would ever improve sellers'pro…ts to communicate information about a buyer's preferences.
Proposition 2 (i) If the sellers are unable to change their style, then communicating information about preferences will have no e¤ ect on sellers'expected pro…ts nor the chance of the winning proposal's style being in the buyer's preferred set, but it may increase or lower the buyer's expected surplus.
(ii) If the sellers can change their style, then communicating information about preferences would always increase the chance the winning proposal will be in the preferred set, but is sometimes bene…cial and sometimes damaging to the sellers and buyer.
We see from the Proposition that the release of information about preferences can have di¤erent e¤ects on the sellers'pro…ts. This for the most part depends upon the ‡exibility of the sellers, the number of sellers, and the re…neness of information released. If …rms are fully ‡exible and the information fully reveals P , then the information will only hurt the sellers.
Likewise, if
n , then extra information will only hurt sellers (it will e¤ectively reduce t).
On the other hand, if p t < 1 n ; then the chance of a seller being a unique seller in the preferred set is too small for maximal pro…ts. The release of either a small amount of information or a limited amount of ‡exibility will increase p t to a more desirable level.
Example 2 n = 2, V = 2, a(x) = 1 x=2, T = f1; 2g; P = ff1g; f2gg; S = f1; 2g,
Let us …rst look at the case when sellers cannot change style. With this g; the information sent allows the seller knows whether or not he is in the preferred set. If the seller is in P , then there is a 1=2 chance that the other seller is in P=T . Denote the strategy of a seller with a style in P as F p and the strategy of a seller with a style in P=T as F np : We then have two indi¤erence equations. A seller in P must be indi¤erent to all strategies in his support.
Likewise, if the seller is in P=T , we have
This yields F p (x) = 3x 2+x and F np (x) = 4x 2+x : Note the ex-ante expected pro…t of the sellers is still 1=4 and the equilibrium CDF without information being released is F (x) = 7x 4+2x . Now let us look at the case when sellers can costlessly change their styles to any style in T: Here, both sellers will switch to the preferred style. We then have a single indi¤erence condition:
This condition implies F (x) = 2x x+2 with ex-ante expected seller pro…ts of 0.
We now wish to use an example where depending upon the parameters, a buyer may gain from sending information or not gaining from sending information.
For this example, the sellers can correctly distinguish the buyer's preferred set but cannot switch styles.
Without information transmitted, i.e., g(P ) = s for all P 2 P; a seller will use F (x) such
This implies that
The buyer's expected surplus is 2
Since F is uniform, we have the buyer's surplus equal to
With information, a seller knows whether he is in the preferred set or not. If he is in the preferred set, a seller will use F p (x) that solves
This implies F p (x) = x=(p=t): If a seller is not in the preferred set, he will use F np that solves
This implies F np (x) = x=(1 (p=t)). The buyer's surplus is 2
Since both F p and F np are uniform, this surplus equals We see here that the extra information can e¤ect the buyer's expected surplus either way.
This happens even when the sellers cannot switch styles and the chance the proposal is in the preferred set is unchanged. In such a case, sellers are not a¤ected in terms of expected pro…ts. The buyer is e¤ected since the buyer cares about the winning e¤ort and while the sellers expected pro…ts are not changed, their strategies are. One note about e¢ ciency. The ambiguity in the buyer's surplus causes the sum of the buyer's expected surplus and the sellers'expected surpluses to also be ambiguous. Thus, it isn't clear which is more e¢ cient. 8 
Information about the Sellers
Above we assumed that the sellers competing for the contract do not know each other. In many situations, this may very well be the case. In other situations, sellers may know who they are competing against. For instance, the contract selection may be in two stages. In the …rst stage there is a call to see who is interested. In the second stage, a longer proposal (bid) is required. It is after this …rst stage that information can be communicated about who is competing. 9 We now analyze the e¤ect of such communication about the identity of the sellers (which would be more pertinent to situations with less sellers).
Before continuing, we need to be more speci…c about the sellers' types when there is a possibility of changing styles. We de…ne a seller i's type to be a default style t i and a set of styles T i to which the seller can costlessly switch to (where t i 2 T i T ). A seller is unable to change his style if T i = ft i g: Being consistent with the prior sections, we assume that each style has an equal chance of being the default style and there is symmetry with respect to the sets of styles. For example, if there are three styles, two sellers and there is a 1/10 chance 8 An e¢ cient allocation would have select one seller (…rst selection from any sellers with a possible style in the preferred set). There will be some optimal level of e¤ort by this selected seller. (To avoid corner solutions, we would either need to make the seller's cost of e¤ort be convex rather than linear or make the buyer's utility of e¤ort be concave in e¤ort.) 9 It is possible that after the …rst stage, the competing sellers are invited for a meeting together.
that T 1 = f1; 2g, then there is also a 1/10 chance of T 1 = f1; 3g or T 1 = f2; 3g. In addition, for seller 2, there would also be a 1/10 chance of T 2 being any of these sets.
Formally, each seller i's set of styles must be drawn from T i 2 T and the set of all possible sellers'types is T T n T 1 T 2 : : : T n : The probability of each set occurring is given by : T ! R i) . This setup results in two properties. First, an individual's type is independent of another's individual type. Thus, one infers nothing about the other's types from one's own type. Second, there is an equal chance of all types occurring. This is consistent with the rest of the paper.
Note that without information, there is an equilibrium where all sellers stick with their default style. This is because for each possible style in a seller's choice set, there is an equal chance of another seller having that style as a default. We call this equilibrium, the default equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (i) If the sellers are unable to change their style, that is, T i = ft i g, then making the sellers'types public information will have no e¤ ect on sellers'expected pro…ts nor e¤ ect the chance that the winning proposal will be in the preferred set.
(ii) If the sellers are able to change their style, the buyer's surplus may increase or decrease.
(iii) If there are two sellers and they can change their style, then making the sellers' types public information would increase the sellers'pro…ts compared to those in the default equilibrium.
Here, the ex-ante pro…ts without information is the same as before: 1=4. When the sellers' identities are disclosed, the expected pro…t is 0 when t 1 = t 2 and 1=2 when t 1 6 = t 2 : Since each possibility happens half the time, the overall expected pro…ts is 1/4.
Example 5 n = 2, V = 2, a(x) = 1 x=2, t = 3; p = 1, (ff1; f1; 2gg; f2; f2; 3gg) = (ff2; f1; 2gg; f3; f2; 3gg) = : : : = 1=36:
The ex-ante expected seller pro…ts without information about the other seller's type is : Each would use a CDF that satis…es
This implies
. Now let us look at the equilibrium when all the sellers'types become public knowledge.
When T 1 6 = T 2 ; for instance, when T 1 = f1; 2g and T 2 = f2; 3g: Any equilibrium would have them choosing di¤erent styles for their bids. If seller 1 in equilibrium selected style 2 and there was a possibility that seller 2 also would select style 2, then seller 1 can do strictly better by choosing the same e¤ort but style 1. Thus, when T 1 6 = T 2 ; the sellers' choose di¤erent styles. Since p = 1, there is a 1=3 chance they both will not be in the preferred set. Hence, their indi¤erence condition is
When T 1 = T 2 , it is an equilibrium for seller i to randomly choose (with equal chance) between the two styles in the set T i . Doing so will give them 1=2 probability of submitting the same style and 1=6 probability of being unique in the preferred set yielding expected payo¤ of 1=6. The equilibrium CDF is F (x) = 11x=(x + 2): This equilibrium will yield the lowest payo¤. The chance of T 1 = T 2 is 1/3. Therefore, the expected pro…t is Proposition 3 is comparable to Proposition 2, but where the potential increase of information is about the sellers' types rather than the buyer's preferences. While the results are similar when the sellers cannot make changes, they di¤er when the information is about the sellers' types rather than the buyer's preferences. Namely, when sellers can alter their style, communication about the sellers' types helps their pro…ts, but communication about the buyer's preferences can help or hurt sellers'pro…ts. The reason for this is when the information is about types, the sellers want to di¤erentiate themselves, but when it is about the buyer's preferences, they want to increase the likelihood of having a preferred style which may hurt di¤erentiation.
These results should still hold if we adding switching cost to switching styles. Sellers would not be harmed by the communication of information, but now when it is advantageous to switch, the sellers will weigh the gains against the potential cost and thus switch less frequently. Also, if information about the sellers is about the number of sellers competing rather than their types, the situation would be comparable to that where sellers cannot switch styles and such communication will have no e¤ect in expected payo¤s.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we considered the case of sellers trying to win a contract with a buyer where a buyer has preferences over styles of designs. Interestingly, while a losing seller may always complain about how the buyer did not properly communicate his preferences, that seller's expected pro…ts ex-ante may have been higher thanks to this lack of communication (as possible in the case when sellers can switch styles).
Although a very di¤erent model, Ganuza (2007) presents a case where the release of additional information about the buyer's preferences can be bene…cial to the sellers. The extra information creates a local monopoly for a seller whose product is closest to the buyer's preferences. 10 This di¤erence to our model can be explained by the following toy model that combines features of both models. There is a buyer and two sellers: one that sells type A objects and the other of type B objects. With equal probability, the buyer either values object A at v and object B at 0 or values object B at v and object A at 0. A seller can produce the other type of object at cost c otherwise the cost is 0. A buyer can choose to discover his type before issuing the contract. If this type is discovered before, it becomes public information.
Otherwise, the type is discovered after the contract is signed but before the work is …nished, allowing the seller to switch types at cost c. If the type is discovered before, the buyer with the correct type wins an auction and receives c. The buyer's expected pro…ts is v c. If the type is not discovered, we assume that in the second stage the buyer has bargaining power.
In this case, both …rms compete away pro…ts and the buyer receives the good for a price of 0.
However, there is a 50% chance that the buyer will have to pay c. Thus, his expected pro…ts is v c 2 : Hence, the buyer does better without discovering the information. In our model, the buyer knows the information before choosing a contract and can decide whether or not to reveal it to the buyers. In this toy model, not revealing information will change the behavior compared to not having information since the buyer can still make use of this information in selecting a contract. Bidding c is now the equilibrium with the buyer selecting the correct …rm. The expected pro…t of the buyer will be again v c.
We now conclude with several suggestions for future work. One possibility is to have smooth preferences such as in the Hotelling (1929) or Salop (1979) models. This type of preference structure was used in the aforementioned Ganuza (2007) model and has promise (though keeping in mind that from the above discussion it is not obvious that the results will change).
One may consider that in the contest stage there is no advantage to design that exceeds the necessary work. In such a case, the c such that a(c) = 0 will serve as a bid cap and the buyer will randomly select among those putting e¤ort at the cap. In this case, the equilibrium will be similar to that in Che and Gale (1998). However, Kaplan and Wettstein (2006) give arguments why such a cap should be considered soft as whereby the equilibrium would not qualitatively be di¤erent to the one in this paper.
One can also investigate teams of sellers as we see that often in contract contests, parties submit joint bids. Studying such mergers in our framework adds the interesting element that merging lower the chance of having a preferred style. Finally, it would be worthwhile to examine the same issues but with a di¤erent foundation for the model. For example, one can model the all-pay auction as one of incomplete information about values or costs of e¤ort as in Amann and Leininger (1996) or using a Tullock (1980), rent-seeking success function.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
We …rst show that there cannot be an atom (discontinuous jump in F i ) in the mixed strategy equilibrium at any strictly positive point. We show this by contradiction. Denote the probability seller i winning by choosing x as W i (x): Suppose there is an atom played by seller i at x > 0. For this to happen, there must be a strictly positive probability of seller i winning at that point, that is, W i (x ) > 0, since choosing x > 0 is costly. In addition, choosing any y < x must yield a strictly lower probability of winning, W i (y) < W i (x ) for all y 2 [0; x ). This is because from our assumptions on a(x), it pays to procrastinate if it does not hurt one's chance of winning, that is, for any constant c > 0, we have min x2X c (V a(x)) x = min x2X x:
Since choosing y < x yields a lower probability of winning, for any set X (z) [z; x ) where z 2 [0; x ); there must be some seller j choosing a y in X (z) (there exists a j where y is in the support of F j ). However, choosing x + " will yield a discreet jump in probability of winning for seller j. Thus, for large enough z, we will get a contradiction. (There exists a
We now show that if p=t 2 (0; 1); seller i cannot be bidding an atom at 0 by way of contradiction. Say that seller i is choosing an atom at 0 of magnitude m 2 (0; 1]. This implies
If seller i is the only seller choosing an atom at 0, seller i's pro…ts must be equal to the chance that i is the unique seller in the preferred set times the pro…t of winning with a zero e¤ort, namely, (
)). All other sellers can bid
" and obtain pro…t that approaches (
Since this is a mixed-strategy equilibrium, a seller j is indi¤erent to bidding between any two points in the support of F j . Since there are no atoms above zero, seller i can bid at the top of j's support and win with certainty. This should be the same pro…t that seller j earns since at the top of j's support, seller j also wins with certainty. However, seller j's pro…ts is strictly higher than seller i's pro…ts since p=t is strictly between 0 and 1. Thus, seller i would have incentive to deviate and would not place an atom at 0. If there is more than one seller placing an atom at 0 and p=t is strictly between 0 and 1, then any seller choosing an atom would have incentive to bid " since the probability of winning will jump discretely. Now we know that if p=t 2 (0; 1); an equilibrium will not contain atoms anywhere. We will now show that zero must be the lowest point in the support of all sellers. Suppose z i > 0 is the lowest point of the support of player i. Let z = min i z i : Since in equilibrium there are no atoms, the probability of winning at z must be the same as the probability of winning at 0 for all sellers, that is, W i (z) = W i (0) for all i. The seller j whose support F j includes z also has W j (z) = W i (0); however, j can then improve pro…ts by choosing 0. Thus, z = 0:
The probability of j winning by bidding 0, W j (0); must be the probability of that one is the only seller in the preferred set, (
Hence, the pro…t of a seller j that bids 0 must be (
Another seller k cannot achieve higher pro…t since a seller j bidding 0 can simply bid at the top of k's support and achieve at least k's expected pro…ts (it can be strictly higher if F j (z) < 1 where z is the highest point in k's support.) Another seller k cannot have lower pro…ts since k can simply bid 0 and receive pro…ts equivalent to that of seller j. Hence, all sellers must have pro…ts equal to (
If, p=t = 0 or 1; the pro…t would be zero as in all the possible equilibria in a standard all-pay auction with incomplete information (see Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries, 1996, and Kaplan, Luski, Wettstein, 2003) . This is consistent with our formula for expected pro…ts.
Proof of Proposition 1.
First, we will show that any equilibrium must be symmetric. Assume that in equilibrium there is an j, k and z where z is in the support of j and k, but F j (z) 6 = F k (z). Since z is in the support of j and k, we must have
and W k (z) = F j i6 =j;k F i this implies we must have F j (z) = F k (z): This leaves the only possibility if sellers j and k do not use the same strategy then supports of F j and F k are disjoint. Now notice that in equilibrium there cannot be any gaps in F i (since there are no atoms in equilibrium and a seller at the top of a gap would have incentive to lower his bid).
Thus, if there are two points z j and z k where z j < z k and z j is in the support of F j and z k is in the support of
It then follows that there cannot be a gap in an individual F i 's support. This implies that the supports of all sellers coincide and hence so do all the F i 's. We denote this common CDF as F .
All the points in the support must yield the same expected pro…t. This pro…t must equal the gains from winning (V a(x)) times the probability of winning minus the e¤ort x. The probability of winning is the chance that all sellers are set T =P and put forth lower e¤ort,
(1 p t ) n F (x) n 1 ; plus the chance that the particular seller is in P and all the other sellers (if any) that are in P put forth lower e¤ort. This latter expression is slightly more complicated and equal to
Combining yields equation (1) which for each x has a unique solution for F (x). The second half of the proposition has the problem reduce to that of one with bid-dependent rewards, an environment studied by Kaplan, Luski and Wettstein (2003) . Here, there is a possibility of an atom at zero. However, similar to the above, there is a unique equilibrium among active participants (a seller i is active if there exists an x i > 0 where F i (x) < 1).
Proof of Proposition 2.
(i) Remember that the expected seller pro…t without information release (Lemma 1) is (n; p t ). The ex-ante expected pro…t for a particular seller i in the case of information release
is the expected pro…t for seller i of style t i after the information s is released and r(s) as the probability s would be sent. This probability depends upon the function g used and equals r(s) = X P 2P
gs(P ) #P where g s (P ) represents the probability s is sent when the true preferences are P .
After the information is released, for the same reasons as in Lemma 1, there can't be atoms in the distribution. For this reason, the e¤ort of zero must be in the support (otherwise, if one will have the lowest e¤ort in any case, it might as well be zero). Since it is a mixed strategy, the expected pro…t must be equal for all points in the support including zero. Hence, we can look at the expected pro…t for an e¤ort of zero. This is simply V a(0) times the probability of being the only preferred seller. The probability equals i (t i ; s)(1 p t ) n 1 where i (t i ; s) is the probability of a seller of style t i is in P when signal s is sent. Denote P(t i ) fP 2 P : t i 2 P g.
We can then write i (t i ; s) = X P 2P(t i )
However,
We now can make a further simpli…cation:
Now note that #P = 
Hence, we have
Since the sellers cannot switch styles, then the probability that the buyer will get a proposal in the preferred style will not change. We show in Example 3 that the e¤ect on the buyer's surplus can go either direction.
(ii) To show that the information can be damaging when sellers can switch their style, let us look at an example. Let us say that there are two sellers, p = 1 and t = 2. Pro…t for each seller is (2; 2 ), which is the highest pro…t. Note that announcing also building style will have no further e¤ect as in part (i).
Since the sellers have the ability to switch styles, communicating information about preferences to them only increases the probability that there will be a proposal in set P . This improves the buyer's surplus.
Proof of Proposition 3.
(i) This can be shown in a similar manner to that in the proof in Proposition 2 (i).
The key is that now the information release is about the sellers' types and not the buyer's preferences. Since information about types is fully revealed and T i = ft i g for all i, the set of possible states sent is S = T n . Denote s as the actual information announced and s i as the type of seller i: The overall pro…t is P s2S r(s) i (s) and the pro…t for each case of information release is i (s) = i (s) (V a(0)) where i (s) is the probability of seller i being unique in the preferred set when the state is s. The probability of each state occurring r(s) is simply 1=#S = 1=(T n): The probability of being unique in the preferred set i (s) = 0 if there exists a j 6 = i, where t i = t j . The odds of this occurring is 1 ( a(x) = 0; n = 2, p = 1 and T i = ft i g: Without information, sellers choose e¤ort according to
There is a 1=2 chance that the sellers have the same style. When this is the case, we look at the expected maximum of V =3. When they have di¤erent styles, we look at the average of V =4. Overall, the expected surplus is (7=24)V .
In the case when sellers'types become public knowledge, when the sellers have the same style, they use G according to V G(x) x = 0: This implies G = x=V , which is uniform on [0; V ]. The expected maximum e¤ort is then 2=3. When the sellers have di¤erent styles they choose zero e¤ort since either they are unique in the preferred set or the other seller is in the preferred set. Since each possibility occurs half the time, overall the expected e¤ort is 1=3.
This is higher than when there is no information.
For an example where the buyer surplus is higher without seller information, take the previous example, but change the possible seller types. Now the possible types are f1; f1gg; f2; f2gg; f1; f1; 2gg; f2; f1; 2gg with an equal chance of each. Whenever, T 1 = T 2 = f1; 2g, it is an equilibrium to randomly choose one's type. This has the same payo¤ as the equilibrium without information being passed and sellers can't switch. It occurs 1=4 of the time. For all the cases when #T 1 = #T 2 = 1, we have the same expected payo¤ as the case when information is passed and sellers cannot switch. When #T 1 6 = #T 2 ; the equilibrium is for sellers to have di¤erent styles. This generates 0 e¤ort. The expected e¤ort is This happens 1=2 the time. In this case, without switching the there is a seller with a preferred style 3=4 of the time. With switching, there is a preferred style all the time. Thus, with information, there is a surplus increase of =8 from a preferred style of being more likely.
Not sending information yields higher buyer surplus if (iii) Here the equilibrium requires sellers choosing both a style in their set and an e¤ort.
When choosing the style, sellers maximize pro…t if they are able to di¤erentiate themselves from one another. This increases the chance that they will be the sole seller in the preferred set. (There is still an equal chance for each style to be preferred by the buyer.) If T 1 6 = T 2 , then the equilibrium choice of style will be di¤erent even if the original default styles were the same (t 1 = t 2 ): This is because seller i can chose a e t i 2 T i =T i where it is certain that the other seller will choose. By doing so, seller i maximizes the chances that he would be alone in the preferred set. It is less clear what will happen if T 1 = T 2 . To illustrate this assume that T 1 = T 2 = f1; 2g, t 1 = 1 and t 2 = 2. This is a standard coordination game. While initially they are on di¤erent styles and it is an equilibrium to stay with the defaults, there is another equilibrium where they choose between 1 and 2 with equal probability. In such a game, this mixing yields the lowest equilibrium payo¤. From this we see that the lowest possible equilibrium payo¤ for the sellers happens when they choose with equal probability each style in their set whenever T 1 = T 2 :
How does this compare to pro…t in the default equilibrium? Notice that pro…ts in the default equilibrium are the same as when all sellers choose with equal chance among all the possible styles in their set-there is still the same chance of another seller having the same style. Let us now use this as a baseline and look at the case when the sellers' types are made public. Whenever T 1 = T 2 ; the lowest possible new payo¤s are the same as our baseline. Whenever, T 1 6 = T 2 the payo¤s strictly increase compared to the baseline. Hence, the addition of such information is bene…cial to the sellers.
